I know if you're looking at the subject line alone you'll think I'm proposing introducing a security vulnerability, but let me explain.
There are some problems with storing an upstream signing key inside the package. It might get stale, not incorporating additional subkeys necessary for signature verification or revocations. Also, it requires manual work on the part of the maintainer and can't be done automatically.
Folks outside the OpenPGP ecosystem might not know this, but the Web of Trust is now not the only way of doing things. There are ways, like Web Key Directory, DANE, and LDAP, to not only discover an OpenPGP key, but also verify that it really belongs to the person in the user ID.
First, we save in some metadata file somewhere (debian/upstream/metadata?) the user IDs (aka names and email addresses) of upstream, or perhaps mappings of key IDs to email addresses. When uscan goes to verify the signature, it will know the key ID of the signer but might not know their user ID, so it will look in the mapping table.
Then it will fetch the key using an authenticated method and use it to verify the signature.
I hope that makes sense. Unfortunately I only know C, so I don't think I'll be able to contribute this.
Thanks
--- /etc/devscripts.conf ---
Empty.
--- ~/.devscripts ---
DEBSIGN_KEYID=A23F3CA5BD39D9EB18AC7F35B3F4DD2861F4CDBA!
DEBSIGN_MAINT="John Scott"
BTS_MAIL_READER="evolution %s"
BTS_INTERACTIVE=yes
BTS_CACHE=yes
BTS_CACHE_MODE=full
DEBCOMMIT_SIGN_TAGS=yes
DEBCOMMIT_SIGN_COMMITS=yes
WHOUPLOADS_DATE=yes
DSCVERIFY_KEYRINGS=/home/john/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
DEBCHANGE_RELEASE_HEURISTIC=changelog
DEBCHANGE_MULTIMAINT_MERGE=yes
DEBCHANGE_MAINTTRAILER=yes