- Package:
- release-notes
- Source:
- release-notes
- Submitter:
- Julian Andres Klode
- Date:
- 2025-07-23 10:31:00 UTC
- Severity:
- normal
Package: release-notes
Severity: normal
X-Debbugs-Cc: jak@debian.org
APT in trixie has the following cut-offs for OpenPGP key algorithms:
2026-02-01
- Keys with SHA-1 self-signatures. These need to be resigned, that
is, change the expiry to the same value as before, for example.
- SHA224 signatures
- v3 signature packets, as used by Open Build Service
2028-02-01
- Brainpool Curves
2030-02-01
- RSA keys with fewer than 3072 bits
APT will issue warnings 1 year ahead of the cut-off dates.
Other keys have been cut-off in the past, such as RSA below
2048 bit, DSA keys.
The policy can be adjusted following the hint in
/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/apt-sequoia.config
But we may want to introduce a tiny feature in a stable update
to simply set a fixed policy date (i.e. verify keys using the
policy as of 2025-08-01 to keep a trixie system with no changes
in behavior).
Thank you for opening this. Here are some questions however: 1) is this info relevant for users of APT or for repository providers? 2) if its relevant for users, what should users look for and what should they do when they encounter whatever APT will say/do? 3) should this go into "Issues to be aware of for trixie" or "Possible issues during upgrade"? 4) trust all the details are in the APT documentation or a manpage. Which one is it / which URL can we link to? Chris
Both. repository providers may want to pass --audit to `apt update` to check with a 2-years-ahead policy to get messages a year ahead of their users. They will receive warnings by APT 1 year ahead of the deprecation and need to figure out how to update the keys for their repositories. How to do that will depend on their repository, and I can't provide any advise on that matter other than contacting the repository provider. It may even warrant its own section, tbh, to give a clear entry point of how APT repositories are cut-off. We do not provide documentation outside the comment and the debian/NEWS entry. We should document the mechanisms, but not the policy, inside APT. The policy is subject to the policy file in the packaging, as well as the default Sequoia policy which are in a sense outside of APT's control as an upstream identity (different downstreams may apply their own policies).
* Julian Andres Klode <jak@debian.org> [250721 22:07]: Surely the apt package in Debian is to be used in Debian, and thus can document the Debian-specifics? If I understand you right, it also ships a Debian-specific policy file. Chris