The at package's PAM configuration file (/etc/pam.d/atd) contains user_readenv=1 which makes it vulnerable to CVE-2025-6018, a local privilege escalation vulnerability. CVE-2025-6018 allows unprivileged local attackers to inject arbitrary environment variables via ~/.pam_environment, which can be used to spoof system variables like XDG_SEAT and XDG_VTNR. This allows attackers to gain "allow_active" privileges normally reserved for physically present users, enabling unauthorized access to Polkit actions. The user_readenv feature has been deprecated by PAM upstream due to security concerns: https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/ecd526743a27157c5210b0ce9867c43a2fa27784 This is similar to bug #761600. Fix: Remove user_readenv=1 from pam.conf I have prepared a fix in my fork at: https://salsa.debian.org/AndersHeimer/at References: - CVE-2025-6018 - Bug #761600 (similar issue in openssh-server) - https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-6018
Control: tags -1 + moreinfo Control: retitle -1 1118448 atd: uses pam_env user_readenv=1 in auth stack (should it be removed?) While it is possibly a good idea to remove the use of th pam_env user_read+env for atd, for CVE-2025-6018 it was important that SUSE had pam_env called before pam_systemd in the *session* stack. In atd pam_env is only used only in the auth stack and in particular used last. Can you elaborate where you see a similar issue than CVE-2025-6018 for atd? Maybe I'm missing something? In any case we know that the functionality of reading user specific environment file is deprecated since 1.5.0 version of pam, and so it might be a good idea to drop the user_readenv=1 accordingly. Regards, Salvatore
Hi Salvatore, Thanks for the quick review. I drew parallels to the SUSE scenario for CVE-2025-6018 to quickly. Since at only invokes pam_env in the auth stack, I agree that is not vulnerable to CVE-2025-6018. Please reclassify the report accordingly; remove the security tag and lower the severity. If you want, I can open a merge request removing the deprecated functionality of reading a user specific environment file. Thanks again, Anders
Hi Anders, And thanks to you for coming back quickly on the assessment and double-checking things. Appreciated. Ack! Done so now. I would like to leave this decision to the maintainer of the package, but I think it is sensible. So I would suggest you go ahead filling a merge request for review from Jose. Regards, Salvatore